ILPA'S response to request for further written evidence from Consitutional Affairs Committee for its inquiry into asylum and immigration appeals

Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Bill 2003

ILPA's priority in this Bill is clause 10, a draconian measure aimed against foreigners who seek to live and work in the UK. Hence, we limit our written evidence at this stage to this clause.

CLAUSE 10: ABOLITION OF THE IMMIGRATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL

"If Tribunals were to be at liberty to exceed their jurisdiction without any check by the courts, the rule of law would be at an end" Denning LJ, Master of the Rolls[1]

ILPA is totally opposed to the package of provisions contained in clause 10 of the Bill. They represent an unconstitutional assault on the immigration system, leaving decision-making without proper scrutiny by the courts where people's lives and human rights are at risk.

- It is worth recalling the words of Prime Minister, Tony Blair, when in opposition during debate on proposed immigration legislation in 1992:

  "No justification has been advanced [for the withdrawal of rights of appeal from visitors and students by the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993] other than this, which we heard again from the Secretary of State: the system is overloaded. It is a novel, bizarre and misguided principle of the legal system that if the exercise of legal rights is causing administrative inconvenience, the solution is to remove the right. No doubt that might satisfy the bureaucrats and Government administrators in many areas, but it can hardly be a justification for removing rights…When a right of appeal is removed, what is removed is a valuable and necessary constraint on those who exercise original jurisdiction. That is true not merely of immigration officers but of anybody. The immigration officer who knows that his decision may be subject to appeal is likely to be a good deal more circumspect, careful and even handed than the officer who knows that his power of decision is absolute. That is simply, I fear, a matter of human nature, quite apart from anything else"

  Tony Blair, House of Commons, 2nd November 1992

- Clause 10 will affect everyone who benefits from the appeals system: husbands, wives, sons and daughters from all ethnic groups in the UK will find that they are barred from challenging decisions of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT). We are unaware of any concern by the Government about the effect on race relations of these provisions.

- Clause 10 is about the way we are governed. By removing the scrutiny of the higher

courts (the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords)in immigration decisions, it will upset the checks and balances on government powers, contrary to our long established democratic tradition and contrary to the rule of law.

- Without the vigorous supervision of a separate, more senior court, such as the IAT, consisting of experienced judges (many of whom have been Adjudicators), miscarriages of justice will inevitably occur.

- Applications for permission to appeal are also made by the Home Office if they are of the view that an appeal has been allowed in error. The Home Office is increasingly appealing against positive Adjudicator decisions. This surely demonstrates that both parties are of the view that Adjudicators need to be supervised by a higher court.

- The IAT has been effectively supervising Adjudicator decisions for 34 years, since it came into existence in the Immigration Appeal Act 1969. As immigration, asylum and human rights law has become more complex, the IAT has been invaluable in giving guidance to Adjudicators on matters of law and the approach that should be adopted in deciding cases. This guidance leads to more efficient and consistent decision making.

- Under clause 10, there will only be the opportunity to apply for a very limited *review* of a decision – not to an independent body, but to the very Tribunal which has itself reached the decision under review.[2] This offends the basic principle of natural justice that 'no one should be a judge in their own cause'. Worse, such review can only be carried out once[3] and will be only by reference to written submissions[4] without the opportunity (as presently exists) to have an oral hearing to argue about what may be complicated issues of law.

- The AIT will have to decide the potentially complicated issues of whether to uphold the decision, have a re-hearing, or substitute the first decision with another decision. The AIT will have to decide the contents and nature of a substituted decision without the benefit of oral argument. This means that there would be no opportunity to consider any new oral evidence if required. If an appellant - whether claimant or Home Office - had new information there would be no opportunity to have that heard by the AIT.

- Only the AIT will have the power to review itself and therefore will not be accountable to anyone. There will be no review by a supervisory or independent body. If it refuses to review itself there will be no challenge against such a refusal. [5]

- *Clearly the legitimacy of the AIT will be undermined by a lack of independent supervision in addition to having the onerous task set out above.*

- The legitimacy and the accountability of the AIT is further undermined by the removal of the requirement that the President of the AIT be a High Court Judge. The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 made it a requirement that a High Court Judge be appointed by the Lord Chancellor.[6] This requirement was introduced into the 2002 Act in the knowledge that it might be mitigation for the abolition of Judicial Review of the IAT if a High Court Judge was presiding over it, so that senior judicial supervision was maintained over the IAT ('statutory review' replaced judicial review in the 2002 Act: section 101 refers).

- Whilst there continues to be poor quality decision making by the Home Office at the outset of the process, (a fact referred to by a wide range of respondents to the DCA) and a lack of Home Office Presenting Officers to represent at appeal hearings, it is not safe to have a one tier appeal process. The burden upon Adjudicators to get the decision right at the first and only appeal would be unreasonably onerous. The impact upon the appellant of an incorrect dismissal of an appeal could be fatal.

The Government's justification

- The Government has set out extremely limited reasons for abolition of the IAT. In the annex to its consultation letter of 27 October 2003, the Government stated that: 'A single tier would simplify the appeals system and reduce the risk of people seeking to play the system by making unfounded appeals to frustrate final resolution of their case…The current appeals system is still too long and complicated. It provides people with opportunities to abuse the system in order to cause delay or abscond'.

- However, it is not the right of appeal to the IAT that causes delay in the asylum system. An asylum seeker has only ten working days (five days if in detention) to appeal from an adjudicator to the IAT. If his/her grounds of appeal have no merit, permission to appeal will be refused and the appeals system is exhausted subject only to any resort to the very speedy paper process of statutory review under Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 section 101. Contrast the frequent delays of at least months between a person claiming asylum in the UK and his/her interview by the Home Office; between interview and Home Office decision; between exhaustion of appeal rights and removal from the UK. We suggest that the second tier of appeal is not a major cause of delay in the asylum system and its abolition remains unjustified by the Government. As to the Government's comment that the two-tier system is 'complicated', it is no more complex than any other system of appeal rights in the UK. The proposal for one tier also contradicts the proposals on two tier appeals made in the Leggatt report.

The statistics

- The Government has justified the abolition of the IAT on basis of statistics. The Home Secretary has consistently referred to 3% of appeals to the IAT being successful and, therefore, a 97% success rate at the adjudicator stage[7]. But this is not borne out by any analysis of the statistics published by the government.

- According to government statistics, around a third of applications for permission to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal are successful. In 2002, the majority of appeals determined by the IAT were either allowed (11%, 620 cases) or remitted back to an Adjudicator for further consideration (49%, 2,700 cases). The remainder were either dismissed (36%, 2,015 cases) or withdrawn (4%, 225 cases). Where the Home Secretary gets his 3% from is not understood by anyone. There is always a danger in the use of statistics, which can be manipulated. What is clear is that in 61% of cases determined by the IAT in 2002 the Adjudicator was found have made an error, or re-consideration was found to be required. This must demonstrate that there is a need for proper scrutiny of Adjudicator's decisions.

- In any event, would we want to abolish the right to challenge miscarriages of justice in the criminal courts on the basis that only a small proportion of people will be affected?

CLAUSE 10 (7): THE DEMISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

- This provision makes clear that no court will have ANY supervisory or other jurisdictions in relation to the AIT. Even where the decision of the AIT is unlawful, or where the AIT has acted in breach of natural justice or outside of its jurisdiction, the higher courts will have no power to entertain applications or appeals. Furthermore this provision excludes ANY supervisory or other jurisdiction in relation to decisions by the Secretary of State to remove or deport a person from the UK, or in respect of any action in connection with such decision.

- The Government's proposals to curb judicial review came as a bolt from the blue. The only prior indication lay in the opaque, vague and uninformative words of Annex A of the DCA/Home Office consultation letter dated 27 October 2003, where the Government said that 'we are looking at ways to restrict access to the higher courts'. It is truly worrying that a British, democratic government can purport to abolish constitutional checks on the powers of the executive without any prior consultation or openness. *Respondents to the consultation letter were denied any opportunity to comment on this extremely important aspect of the Bill.* Bearing in mind that the Bill was published only one month after the consultation letter, the implication is that either the Government kept quiet about this radical proposal or that it was hastily cobbled together.

- It is unconstitutional for a person to have no remedy to the higher courts. The provision risks refugees being returned to persecution and the families of ethnic minorities suffering from human rights violations and separation. The AIT would have unprecedented power. ILPA fears that without judicial scrutiny, decision making will deteriorate in the way expressed by Tony Blair above in 1992.

- Judicial scrutiny of administrative action is a vital element of the rule of law. It is the procedure by which the Judiciary assume a constitutional responsibility to prevent the abuse of executive power. The judiciary ensures that public bodies are not above the law.

- Under current legislation if the Immigration Appeal Tribunal refuses permission to appeal from an Adjudicator's decision, there is no further right of appeal. The person can apply for statutory review (instead of judicial review). This entails a paper review only by a High Court judge of the decision to refuse permission by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. It has only been in place since April 2003 and ILPA considers that this is already a significantly reduced form of judicial scrutiny as compared to judicial review, which exists in other areas of law.

- The proposal calls into question the delicate balance between legislative supremacy and the fundamental common law right of access to the courts.

- Over forty years ago the House of Lords ruled[8] that such clauses cannot 'oust' access to the higher courts to challenge a decision where the jurisdiction of an inferior Tribunal has been exceeded by breaking the rules of natural justice or applying the wrong legal test and answering the wrong legal question or by basing decisions on legally irrelevant considerations. Clause 10 is the most extreme example ever drafted of a 'modern' Government's attempt to curtail the right of access to the courts. It will result also in the abolition of a claimant's right to seek a writ of *habeas corpus*[9].

- The clause provides expressly that the AIT and the Secretary of State can take decisions which are based on "lack of jurisdiction, irregularity, error of law, breach of natural justice, or any other matter" and no court can even "entertain proceedings" to challenge such decisions.[10] This proposal is undemocratic, unconstitutional and antithetical to the rule of law. Such a proposal would be disapproved of elsewhere at any time, but in a modern democracy in the 21st century it is thoroughly reprehensible. It should be deleted from the Bill.

- In practical terms those who have previously been able to access the courts will now seek advice and help from their representatives in the community. MPs' surgeries are likely to be inundated with people seeking advice as to the impact of these measures on their case whether for asylum or because a family member wishes to enter the country as a visitor or student etc. MPs will be faced with the task of explaining that in this country the right of access to the High Court has been abolished, but only for those who are asylum seekers or who wish to immigrate here.

- The dust has barely settled on the 2002 Act and the Government is seeking to remove entirely all forms of judicial safeguard in this area. The Government has not explained why, having replaced judicial review with a paper only statutory review for challenging decisions of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, it is necessary to curtail these rights even further.

Some examples

Case of U

U is a Somali woman who has fled the violent civil war in Somalia. She has claimed asylum. The Home Office refused her asylum claim on the grounds that they believe she is not a Somali, but is an Ethiopian national. The Adjudicator dismissed the appeal, reaching a finding of fact that U was not a Somali national. Professor Lewis from the London School of Economics was asked to comment upon the Adjudicator's Determination, in particular the findings that the Adjudicator had made in respect to U's ethnicity and nationality. He was of the opinion that the Adjudicator had made numerous errors in her approach to the evidence and he reached the firm view that U was a Somali national. An application for leave to appeal to the IAT was made and the report from Professor Lewis was submitted.

The IAT refused permission to appeal concluding that an appeal would have no prospect of success. U applied for a statutory review of this decision by the Tribunal, the decision of the IAT was notified on the 10th of September 2003 and the outcome of the statutory review was received on the 3rd of October 2003 ie within less than one month. The statutory review was successful. Mr. Justice Maurice Kay reversed the decision of the Tribunal to refuse permission stating "in my view it was legally erroneous for the IAT to deal with the report of Professor Lewis in the peremptory manner it did".

Case of F

F is an Algerian national with serious mental health problems. He feared persecution from armed Islamic groups in Algeria. The Adjudicator dismissed the appeal not finding F credible, partly because of his account of his journey through Europe which the Adjudicator did not find credible. An application for permission to appeal was submitted to the IAT. This was supported by an expert's report in response to the Adjudicator's Determination which concluded that F's account was indeed credible. The

IAT refused permission to appeal. F then applied for a judicial review of this decision. The Treasury Solicitors conceded the matter before it went to court for the reason that "the Secretary of State accepts that it is arguable that the IAT has erred".

Case of R and her baby

R is a Ugandan national suffering from AIDS. She has an 8 month old baby who was born in the UK. Prior to the birth of R's baby, R applied for asylum and was refused. She appealed to an Adjudicator who dismissed her case on both asylum grounds and in respect of her human rights. R and her baby were within 10 hours of being removed when solicitors intervened arguing that neither the Secretary of State nor the Adjudicator had considered the rights of R's baby who would undoubtedly be orphaned if they were returned to Uganda. The Secretary of State insisted that R's baby had no rights and it was not necessary for him or an Adjudicator to consider those rights since the baby was making a "voluntary departure" with her mother. R commenced judicial review proceedings against the Secretary of State. Treasury solicitors eventually conceded that an Adjudicator should reconsider R's case and that of her baby's and the alleged breach of human rights in removing them.

CLAUSE 10: REMOVAL OF APPEALS TO THE COURT OF APPEAL

- ILPA considers this removal of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords to be entirely unjustified. ILPA considers that the supervision of the higher courts is vital if decision-making by the Home Office and the AIT is to be kept in check and this important area of law is to keep pace with international human rights developments.

- **Existing rights of appeal**

  The Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 was condemned by Tony Blair during its passage through Parliament as being unfair, arbitrary and seriously detrimental to good race relations. He did, however, welcome the extension by the Act of rights of appeal to asylum seekers. The Act also introduced a new right of appeal from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal to the Court of Appeal on a question of law[11].

  An appeal to the Court of Appeal may only be brought with the permission of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal or, if refused, the permission of the Court of Appeal itself[12]. Such permission will only be granted by the Court of Appeal if it considers that 'the appeal would have a real prospect of success' or 'there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard'[13].

- The Court of Appeal has made clear that as far as immigration appeals are concerned, 'properly reasoned well structured judgments of the IAT will normally mark the end of the road unless there is some uncertainty about the applicable law'[14]. At the same time the Court of Appeal has acknowledged that appeals to the IAT often raise complex issues of fact and difficult questions of law, that the law is still developing and that decisions of some panels of the IAT are of 'uncertain quality'[15] so that appeals to the Court of Appeal would still be necessary.

- The requirements that a would-be appellant must identify an error of law in the tribunal's determination and that he or she must then convince the tribunal or the Court of Appeal that an appeal would have a real prospect of success mean that very few immigrants even attempt to appeal to the Court of Appeal, let alone obtain

permission to do so.

- The Lord Chief justice Lord Woolf, in his report *Access to Justice*, said of appeals to the Court of Appeal that they *serve two purposes: the private purpose, which is to do justice in particular cases by correcting wrong decisions, and the public purpose, which is to ensure public confidence in the administration of justice by making such corrections and to clarify and develop the law and to set precedents.*

- Immigration and asylum is an extremely complex and difficult area of law. Decision makers are required to interpret and apply several pieces of primary legislation, numerous pieces of delegated legislation, the immigration rules, the Immigration and Asylum Appeals Procedure Rules, two major international treaties (the Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights), the relevant case-law of the UK courts and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice and, increasingly, the domestic courts of other jurisdictions. Decision makers are required to determine difficult questions of fact, often on the basis of very limited and fragile information, about the autobiographies of individual immigrants and about conditions in the countries from which they come. In doing so, they are obliged to take into account every relevant consideration and to disregard every irrelevant consideration and they are under a particular duty to give 'anxious scrutiny' to cases where fundamental human rights, including the right to life itself may be at stake.

- These are formidable requirements and it is therefore inevitable that even the most able and conscientious decision makers will from time to time make a decision that is wrong in law, particularly when they are also subject to immense pressure to determine as many appeals as quickly as possible.

The public purpose

- Lord Woolf identified the public purpose of appeals to the Court of Appeal as including the clarification and development of the law and setting of precedents. For the reasons given immigration law is immensely complex and subject to constant change (not least because of the frequency with which new legislation is introduced). For that reason, there is a heightened need in this area for the clarification and development of the law and for the setting of precedents. Refugee and human rights law are particularly subject to change and development. The refugee and human rights Conventions are 'living instruments'. They are intended to provide real and effective protection to individuals falling within their scope in a world in which change is constant but otherwise unpredictable. That means that both Conventions have to be interpreted and reinterpreted in order to determine whether the UK owes any obligation to protect individuals fleeing from circumstances to which the law has not previously had to respond.

Some examples of cases where the Court of Appeal has carried out this public purpose will be set out below.

Misunderstanding as to the jurisdiction of the tribunal

The tribunal's jurisdiction is defined by the relevant statutory provisions. How those provisions are interpreted determines what appeals the tribunal can and cannot hear and what questions it can and cannot address. Those are absolutely fundamental questions and they have on occasion been answered wrongly by the tribunal.

One example is the case of *Zenovics v SSHD*[16]. The tribunal decided that it had no jurisdiction to hear appeals on human rights grounds where an appellant's claim on refugee convention grounds, but not his or her claim on human rights grounds had been certified by the Secretary of State under Schedule 4 to the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act. Had that decision been correct, then a substantial number of appellants who might have been at real risk of serious harm, albeit not for a reason falling within the refugee convention, were they to be removed from the UK would nevertheless have no right of appeal to the Tribunal. The Court of Appeal overturned the Tribunal's decision and held that the Tribunal did have jurisdiction to hear a human rights appeal where only the asylum, but not the human rights claim had been certified. This decision is no longer of practical relevance because the legislative provisions concerned have been repealed. However, it provides a clear illustration of (a) the complexity of the kind of legislative provisions that the tribunal is required to interpret and apply; (b) the potentially disastrous consequences for individuals of an erroneous interpretation of the legislation; (c) the importance of an appeal to the Court of Appeal in order to clarify the meaning and effect of the legislation.

Interpreting the Refugee Convention

The Court of Appeal and the House of Lords have made numerous decisions interpreting (amongst other things) the Refugee Convention definition of a refugee. To take but two examples:

In *Adan v SSHD*[17] the Court of Appeal and then the House of Lords were faced with the question whether fear of persecution arising in the context of clan based civil war could satisfy the Convention definition of a refugee.

In *Shah and Islam v SSHD*[18] the House of Lords very importantly found that women in Pakistan accused of adultery were entitled to asylum. The House of Lord's decision clarified and provided guidance on one of the most difficult issues in refugee law, i.e. what is meant by 'membership of a particular social group'. It is important to note that in this case, the tribunal refused leave to appeal in the *Islam* case (*Shah* was a judicial review of the tribunal's refusal to grant her leave to appeal).

Errors of approach by the tribunal

It is an elementary requirement that in reaching its decision the tribunal is to take account of all relevant evidence. There are many cases where the Tribunal has failed to do that, thereby arriving at decisions which, if left uncorrected, could have potentially disastrous consequences for the appellant. Again to take but two examples:

In *Drrias v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [19] an adjudicator had found that the appellant was a Coptic Christian from Sudan and that if returned to Sudan there was a real risk that he would be detained, physically abused and otherwise persecuted for reasons of his religion by the Islamist regime. The Tribunal allowed the Secretary of State's appeal. The Tribunal did so because it was completely mistaken as to what the adjudicator had found about the appellant. The Tribunal thought that his evidence had been disbelieved by the adjudicator. In fact, the adjudicator had believed his account. The Court of Appeal struck down the tribunal's determination without hesitation.

In *Demirkaya v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [20] the Tribunal found that the appellant, a Turkish Kurd suspected by the authorities of being a separatist had been severely tortured in the past. On one occasion he had been detained by Gendarmes who sliced his back with a bayonet so that he was left with 35 scars. On a number of other

occasions he was detained by the police and severely beaten and tortured, including one time when he was pushed through a window so that he was cut by the glass and then hanged upside down out of the window until he lost consciousness. He was told by the police that he would be killed and his death would be passed off as a suicide. The tribunal found, nevertheless, that he could be returned to Turkey. The Court of Appeal overturned that decision because the tribunal had failed to identify any reason why he would not be treated in the future as he had been in the past.

Inconsistent decisions by the Tribunal

Many asylum seekers flee from similar problems arising in particular countries. Deciding whether they qualify for asylum depends in part upon assessing a common body of evidence about general conditions in those countries (e.g. UN reports, reports by NGOs such as Amnesty International, expert evidence and so on). There have been a significant number of occasions where different Tribunals have reached opposite and irreconcilable conclusions on claims that have been factually almost identical, both in terms of the individual's particular predicaments and in terms of what the evidence shows about circumstances in his or her country.

Procedural unfairness

The Court of Appeal has also allowed appeals against tribunal decisions because of procedural unfairness. In *Macharia v Immigration Appeal Tribunal* [21] the Tribunal heard an appeal by the Secretary of State against an adjudicator's decision that the appellant had well founded fear of being persecuted in Kenya. At the hearing before the Tribunal the asylum seeker's representative was presented by the Secretary of State's representative and by the Tribunal itself with fresh evidence forming a bundle of documents almost 1" thick. She was allowed only 10 minutes in which to look at the documents and prepare her response to them. The Court of Appeal found that that was wholly inadequate time in which to assess that evidence and allowed the appeal because of procedural unfairness.

The statistics

During 2002 the tribunal determined 5,565 appeals[22]. During the 'legal year' (October – September) 2000 – 2001 the Court of Appeal heard only 57 appeals from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. During the legal year 2001 – 2002 the Court of Appeal heard only 66 appeals from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal[23]. In other words, only just over 1% of Immigration Appeal Tribunal determinations were appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Bearing in mind the actual numbers of appeals from the tribunal to the Court of Appeal, it is quite impossible to justify abolition of the right of appeal to the Court of Appeal in terms of any need to remove an impediment to speedy resolution of appeals.

Will references by the President of the AIT to the Court of Appeal be an adequate safeguard?

- In hardly any of the cases mentioned above did the tribunal itself grant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Each of these cases were of considerable importance to the individuals concerned but they also raised complex and important questions of law of wider significance.

- The Bill envisages the Court of Appeal being seised of a case only if the president of

the tribunal decides to make a referral to the Court. The current unwillingness of the tribunal to grant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal even in genuinely important and complex cases provides a strong indication that such cases will not in future be referred to the Court of Appeal.

6 January 2004

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[1] R v Medical Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 QB 574 at 586

[2] Clause 10 (6), new section 105A.

[3] Clause 10 (6), new section 105A (6).

[4] Clause 10 (6), new section 105A (2).

[5] Currently it is possible to apply for Statutory Review to a single High Court Judge if the IAT refuse permission to appeal. Statutory Review was created by section 101 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to prevent refusals of permission to appeal to the IAT to be the subject of judicial review. Section 101 has only been in force since June 2003 and in that time according to Royal Court of Justice Statistics there have been 278 applications made of which 53 were successful.

[6] Schedule 5, paragraph 3.

[7] see for example HC Deb 2 December 2003 c377 and cc399-400

[8] *Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission* [1969] 2AC 147

[9] An ancient prerogative right to secure the release of a person who has been unlawfully detained.

[10] Clause 10(7).

[11] Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, section 9, reproduced Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, Schedule 4, paragraph 23 and Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 s. 103.

[12] Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s. 103(2)

[13] Civil Procedure Rules, rule 52.3

[14] *Koller v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2001] EWCA Civ 1267

[15] Brooke LJ in *Koller*

[16] [2002] EWCA Civ 273

[17] [1998] Imm AR 338

[18] [1999] Imm AR 283

[19] [1997] Imm AR 584

[20] [1999] Imm AR 498

[21] [2000] Imm AR 190

[22] Control of Immigration Statistics United Kingdom 2002 (Cm 6053)

[23] Court of Appeal Review of the Legal Year 2001 - 2002