ILPA opposes the proposal to replace the First-tier Tribunal with a new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority (IIAA), as provided for in the Immigration and Asylum Bill introduced on 30 June 2026. The First-Tier Tribunal has established procedural rules, judicial practice guidance, and appellate structures that have been developed and refined over many years and that must be retained.
Dismantling immigration tribunals in favour of an executive-controlled body would weaken the separation of powers and undermine the rule of law. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 were deliberate constitutional choices by Parliament to strengthen the separation of powers and public confidence in the appeals system.
The Bill itself provides, at s.1(5), that the IIAA must have regard to the public interest, ‘in particular’ to the fact that it is ‘a key part of the immigration and asylum system.’ This echoes the Government’s own description of the reforms, in which it stated that while decisions will be ‘fully independent,’ the new body will be ‘integrated into the immigration system to ensure cases flow through quickly to removal where appeals are unsuccessful.’ ILPA considers that this stated policy intention, which is now placed on a statutory footing, is not compatible with judicial independence. The Restoring Order and Control paper published in November 2025 sets out two explicit objectives: reducing arrivals and increasing removals. ILPA notes with grave concern that a body designed to be integrated into a system with those stated objectives and structured to accelerate the flow of cases toward removal, raises serious questions about the institutional independence of its decision-making.
The Bill confirms this risk. Under s.2(2)-(5), the Home Secretary appoints the Chair and the first Chief Executive of the IIAA, and it is that Chief Executive who appoints the adjudicators who determine appeals against Home Office decisions. Given that the Home Office is a party to every appeal, this creates a serious risk of perceived or actual bias. For this reason, ILPA considers that recruitment to the new body must be overseen by the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Appointments Commission, not by the Home Office.
The appeals process is not being abused, it is available only to those with protection or human rights claims, people whose removal could mean return to persecution, torture, or the permanent separation of families. The consequences of error are irreversible. This is why independent judicial oversight matters, as it is not an obstacle to an effective immigration system, but rather what makes the system safe and legitimate. ILPA is concerned that the proposal to appoint adjudicators without legal qualification or significant legal expertise creates a high risk of error and unfairness. Immigration and asylum law is among the most complex areas of domestic law, and courts have repeatedly noted its complexity. Appointing adjudicators without adequate legal expertise, and without the independent appointment and accountability structures of the existing judiciary, risks unlawful decisions and is likely to increase onward appeals to the Upper Tribunal, judicial reviews, and further legal challenges. This will not achieve the policy objective of reducing delays.
We reiterate that the appeals process is not the cause of delays and backlogs in the immigration system. The Government has justified the Bill by asserting that people are ‘gaming the system, lodging vexatious appeals to frustrate their removal.’ ILPA has seen no evidence for this claim. The evidence consistently identifies two primary drivers of delay: the poor quality of initial Home Office decision-making – the NAO found 42% of sampled asylum decisions in the year to May 2025 had significant or fail errors – and the severe shortage of immigration and asylum legal aid provision. As the Home Affairs Committee noted as far back as 2003, the real flaws in the system appear to be at the stage of initial decision-making, not that of appeal. More than twenty years on, that conclusion remains as pertinent as ever. Replacing the tribunal will not fix those problems. Addressing the quality of Home Office decisions and increasing access to legal aid will.
We need properly funded legal aid. The 30% fee increase introduced in December 2025, although welcome, applies only to new cases and was not backdated, against a fee structure unchanged since 1996 and cut by 10% in 2011. It does not address the underlying deficit of at least 57% in legal aid provision, nor provide long-term sustainability. Without this, advice deserts will persist, the number of unrepresented appellants will continue to rise, and the Bill will not achieve its stated policy aims.
ILPA is further concerned about other clauses in the Bill, including but not limited to clause 1(8), which expressly excludes judicial review challenges to case management decisions. Schedule 3, paragraph 7(a) states that IIAA Procedure Rules may make provision for dealing with matters without a hearing. Schedule 3, paragraph 8 goes further, allowing proceedings to take place at the request of one party even though the other party has had no notice. The risk of mistakes at first instance and the serious consequences of wrong decisions make having these safeguards essential, and removing them undermines the fairness of the appeal system. Furthermore, ILPA is concerned that significant policy detail throughout the Bill is left to regulations not yet published, rather than being set out in the Bill itself. Parliament and stakeholders should be able to scrutinise these details before the Bill completes its passage.
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See also ILPA’s Response to the Call for Evidence: the New Independent Appeals Body (5 May 2026).
- Document Date
- Wednesday July 1, 2026