About Face: The Immigration White Paper and New Uses of Facial Recognition Technologies at UK Borders

BY ELSPETH GUILD AND CATRIONA BARCLAY

Among the numerous initiatives set out in its 2025 Immigration White Paper, the Government heralded a pilot of ‘new intelligent technologies that facilitate contactless travel through eGates’. Elspeth Guild, Global Professor of Social Justice at the University of Liverpool, and Catriona Barclay of Laura Devine Immigration, consider both the deeper implications of passport-free entry and the ongoing technical difficulties surrounding the digitalisation of the UK immigration system.

On 12 May 2025, the UK Government issued a White Paper entitled ‘Restoring Control over the Immigration System’. Among the many initiatives it set out, one, the use of facial recognition as an alternative to passport examination at the UK’s external borders, has already raised eyebrows, including in some neighbouring states. The proposal, which was trialled at UK maritime ports at the end of 2024, is now contained in paragraph 91 of the White Paper as follows (emphasis added):

“We are going further in our vision to revolutionise the UK Border by using technology to make visible changes to security, flow, and the passenger experience. We have already expanded the use of eGates at the border to more nationalities and age groups, processing millions of arrivals through the UK border each year. Later in 2025 we will be piloting new intelligent technologies that facilitate contactless travel through eGates, removing the need for passengers to present their passport, utilising Facial Comparison technology. This state-of-the-art technology is significantly more efficient at identity verification, leading to shorter queues at the border and a much smoother customer experience.”

In this blog, we look at some of the issues which arise as regards this new proposal and how they might be overcome. We will not discuss here the criticisms of privacy and technology experts regarding facial recognition technologies as regards both the heightened obligations of protection as sensitive data and accuracy.

Increasing use of eGates

The rise of eGates at the UK’s ports of entry has been rapid and their use expanding. ‘eGate’ is an abbreviation for electronic immigration gates, also called ABC (automated border control) gates. They are automated barriers that use digitally stored data to verify a traveller’s identity by biometric means. The UK eGate programme was first opened in 2008, initially available only to British and EU citizens. By 2023 there were more than 270 eGates available at 15 air and rail ports in the UK available for nationals of 38 countries (as well as British citizens and certain registered travellers).

In its explanation of how eGates work, the Home Office states that their use is limited to passengers with up-to-date, biometric passports. The information stored on the passport’s chip is read when scanned, and the biometric details such as facial recognition or iris scan are matched against the person standing in front of the eGate screen. The system verifies the person’s identity and the gate normally opens automatically. The Home Office reassures passengers that in the case of a machine malfunction, or difficulty in the verification process when the barrier remains closed, a member of the immigration service will attend to try and resolve any issues.

The UK Government states in the White Paper that ‘our introduction of ETA [Electronic Travel Authorisation] and eVisas [digital immigration permission] means we now know more about everyone coming to the UK’. The implementation of the digitalisation of the UK immigration system as well as the worldwide roll-out of the ETA (including to nationals of all the EU member states as of 2 April 2025), is closely linked to the new proposal of passport-free entry. In any application for an ETA (or a visa for those for whom possession of a visa is a requirement for entry to the UK) the applicant must provide both a machine-readable photo of the title page of their passport (which includes their photo) and a machine-readable photo of themselves which is uploaded as part of the application. Part of the processing of the ETA application is an electronic comparison of the two photos. Part of the processing of the ETA at an eGate is the comparison of the image of the individual (captured by the technology of the eGate) with the image in the passport which currently must be inserted into the eGate’s dedicated slot. The new proposal is that the comparison of the passenger’s photo with the passport at an eGate will no longer be undertaken. Instead, the stored photo from the ETA (or eVisa) will be sufficient (bearing in mind that it should be accompanied in the electronic file by a scan of the supporting passport). For British citizens, the photo stored by the Home Office in the process of issuing the passport replaces the ETA/visa photo equivalent.

Are there problems with this new proposal, or is this simply the continuation of the technologisation of border controls? We will address this question from two perspectives. First, we will examine the meaning of the passport as a tool of international relations and its importance to states as evidence of the relationship of the individual with the state. Secondly, we will look at some of the difficulties which have already occurred concerning the use of facial recognition technology in borders and immigration procedures in the UK.

Legal perspective: passports in international law

Passports belong to the states that have issued them and are issued only to their nationals (with rare exceptions). The purpose of the issuance of a passport is to evidence to those authorities entitled to request sight of it and to the holder, the relationship between the state and the individual. When a state issues a passport to one of its nationals it is effectively confirming the status of that individual as ‘belonging’ to the state. This is important in international law as it is the physical evidence on the basis of which a person can exercise the right in international law itself to leave or enter his or her state (a qualified right). This does not mean that a citizen without a passport is prohibited from exercising the right to enter his or her state but in such instance the state will require other evidence that the person is indeed a citizen. The UK is currently tightening up its rules on entry of British citizens without a valid passport. The information that is stored or otherwise contained in a passport is determined by the rules of the state which issues it. This information is covered by the obligation of the issuing state to protect the personal data of their citizens. There is no international agreement on requirements of information to be contained in passports (or their format). However, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) under its mandate to facilitate travel has sought to establish some common standards on content of passports with substantial success.

From the perspective of the state, the marginalisation of its role through the minimisation of the importance of the passport as the guarantor of the identity of an individual, may be problematic. States are responsible for their citizens and provide them with consular protection. When a foreign state seeks to expel a person, it needs to obtain confirmation from the state of origin that the individual is indeed its citizen and a person to which that state is willing to issue citizenship-related documents. Yet, this is exactly what the new British proposal plans to minimise. Instead of the passport being the principal evidence of identity, British facial recognition technology will be at the centre of identification of the individual for the purposes of crossing the border. Further this technology must be AI driven as manual comparisons are too lengthy and time consuming, destroying the advantages of the system.

The authorities of many states are cautious about this change in the way in which foreign states identify their nationals. While all states have an interest in diminishing identity fraud at border crossing points (with the exception of so-called antipassports, issued by states to members of their intelligence service to disguise the bearer’s real identity), they also have an existential interest in ensuring that they remain in control of the identity of their citizens. The possibility that a foreign state would use alternative means to identify individuals as ‘their’ citizens, contrary to the position of the authorities of the state, is anathema to the doctrine of state sovereignty. This occurred, for instance, as regards the claimed dual nationality of Shamima Begum when she was seeking to challenge deprivation of her British citizenship (the UK authorities claimed that she had Bangladeshi citizenship notwithstanding a statement from the Bangladeshi authorities that she did not). In the case, the UK Supreme Court followed its doctrine of an entitlement to establish, for the purposes of UK law, the meaning of foreign legislation (in this case the Bangladeshi Citizenship Act 1951). But the Bangladeshi authorities did not accept the UK’s assessment and refused to take any responsibility for the woman whom they determined, according to their law, was not their citizen. The result has been that Begum is effectively stateless as no state accepts responsibility for her.

Passports matter, and they matter particularly as their issue is a prerogative of state sovereignty. Marginalising the role of passports in border controls may seem like a good technical fix to keeping passengers moving rapidly through entry ports, but the deeper consequences of such a move may create friction with other states.

Practical perspective: Technical issues with digitalisation

The UK Government states in the White Paper that ‘the move to digital evidence of immigration status will enable [them] to update records in real time when status changes’, and they are ‘continuing to enhance the accuracy and quality of [their] data, to ensure that status information remains up to date’. However, since the implementation of the digitalisation of the UK immigration system, there have been ongoing technical difficulties. These raise serious concerns as regards the UK Government’s handling of individuals’ personal data and the risk to data protection rights, particularly in relation to accessing and evidencing their own digital immigration permission.  

At the House of Lords Justice and Home Office Affairs Committee inquiry into electronic border management systems, the3million and Laura Devine Immigration both urged for the delay of the roll-out of the digitalisation process until the technical issues which were identified then, had been resolved. ILPA also sent a joint open letter to the Home Office, signed by the3million and 230 others on concerns that the UK’s transition to eVisas was not fit for purpose. The Guardian published an article on 14 March 2024, addressing major flaws in the Home Office immigration database which had resulted in 76,000 people being listed with incorrect names, immigration status, or photographs, which is of course pertinent in consideration of the above proposal. The issues associated with its implementation were reported on extensively and the hard deadline of 31 December 2024 was pushed back. There now exists a grace period until 1 June 2025 during which time individuals may continue to use their Biometric Residence Permit or Biometric Residence Card which expired on or after 31 December 2024 for international travel. Nonetheless, this has not mitigated the damage caused by the widespread technical issues which has left many concerned by the precariousness of the UK’s digital immigration system. ILPA and the3million wrote to Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Citizenship, Seema Malhotra MP, on 15 January 2025, again outlining these concerns and summarising a number of the problems related to linking identity documents to eVisas.

Indeed, the3million has been thorough in monitoring and tracking the persistent issues with eVisas and details associated on eVisa holders’ UKVI accounts. On 6 March 2025, they reported an incident whereby there were widespread errors regarding the list of identity documents linked to the account holders, including the nationality showing as ‘Invalid country’ or a nationality that was not related to their own, while expiry dates of the identity document were missing. In the context of the UK Government’s intent to utilise facial recognition technology, the primary concern is the experiences of those who have generated their eVisa only for it to display no picture at all or, more worryingly, the photograph of someone else. On 7 March 2025, the3million published ‘Tatiana’s story’ which concerned an individual who had been granted indefinite leave to remain in the UK but who, when trying to generate a share code for her new employer to evidence her UK immigration permission, found that that the photograph connected to her digital immigration permission was her husband’s picture rather than her own. The lack of tangible proof of her permission meant that she was not able to evidence and prove her right to work in the UK which impacted her career. This is not an isolated incident. 

The implementation of the digitalisation of the UK immigration system (eVisas) and the errors which subsist would suggest that Home Office records are far from accurate. This begs questions as to the quality of the data. ‘Updating records in real time’ suggests that the process is far easier and simpler than it in fact is; the onus is on the eVisa holder to report any errors using the frequently circulated ‘Report an error with your eVisa’ service. There is no way to expedite the review of the error and it can take some time until the error is reviewed by the team. The suggestion that they are ‘continuing to enhance the accuracy quality of the data’ is necessary in consideration of the apparent issues with the current system as it stands. Nonetheless, the proposal to use facial recognition technology without the need for passengers to present their passport seems precarious and risky in light of the present situation. Issues within digitalisation of the UK immigration system must be resolved before piloting ‘new intelligent technologies’.  

Conclusion and Recommendations for Change

In conclusion, from both the perspective of the international relations, and functionality of the Home Office digitalisation system, it is clear that two changes are needed to the programme. First, passports are definitive evidence of an individual’s nationality. The UK expects other countries to respect British passports. On the basis of reciprocity, the UK should accept passports of other countries as the central evidence of individuals’ citizenship identity in border control procedures (and in the absence of question of fraud etc). Facial recognition technology may be a useful adjunct to eGates, but the current practice where the passport is a central element of the decision on entry needs to be retained. Secondly, as proposed by the3million, eVisas which evidence the immigration status of individuals need to be issued to them in a format where they are able to access them. The current system of indirect access is fraught with technical problems and failures. These are causing substantial harm both to individuals and to society as a whole.

ILPA invites members and other leading experts to contribute articles to its monthly blog. The views expressed in all blog posts are the authors’ own and are not necessarily those of ILPA.

Document Date

Wednesday May 28, 2025